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ABSTRACT Among the many indicators of child welfare, rates of child and infant mortality 
and the prevalance of child labour are especially important, particularly in the context of 
developing countries. This paper estimates and simulates a model of child welfare based on 
recently released data for the Indian state of Madhya Pradesh. The results show that some 
policies, like raising female literacy rates or reducing inequality in land holdings, could have 
unexpected effects, while the effects of other policies, like reducing poverty or improving 
infrastructure,  are  more predictable. 
 
1. Introduction 
Among the many indicators of child welfare, two are particularly important: the rates 
of infant and child mortality; and the prevalence of child labour. In 1996, the infant 
(under one) and child (under five) mortality rates in developing countries varied from, 
respectively, nine and 10 deaths per 1000 live births in Cyprus to, respectively, 191 and 
320 deaths per 1000 live births in Niger (United Nations Development Programme, 
1998). The average infant and child mortality rates for the OECD countries were, 
respectively, 13 and 15, and the corresponding numbers for developing countries were 
65 and 95 (United Nations Development Programme, 1998, Table 12). As regards 
child labour, according to the International Labour Office (Ashagrie, 1993) there were 
almost 79 million children in the world (representing nearly 14% of children in the 
10–14 years age group), mostly living in developing countries, who did regular work. 
The proportion of this age group that worked (the “participation rate”) was as high as 
33% in some African countries (Ashagrie, 1993, Table 4). 
Each of these aspects of child welfare has, separately, attracted considerable aca- 
demic research. In the area of mortality rates, to take but a few examples: Lee et al. 
(1997) examined the effects of nutrition, sanitation and water quality on the health of 
children in high mortality regions; LeGrand & Phillips (1996) studied the effects of 
fertility reductions on infant and child mortality; Pattnaik (1995) investigated the 
effects of women’s status on infant mortality and on birth rates; and Dre`ze et al. (1995) 
and Murthi et al. (1995) investigated the effects of women’s empowerment on fertility 
and on child mortality rates. In the area of child labour, again to take a few examples: 
Basu & Van (1998) showed that labour markets could be characterized by multiple 
 
Vani K. Borooah, School of Public Policy, Economics and Law, University of Ulster, Newtownabbey, Northern 
Ireland BT37 0QB 
I am grateful to Thankum and Shoba Arun and to two anonymous referees for several valuable comments on 
an earlier version of the paper. Needless to say, I alone am responsible for its deficiencies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jammu & Kashmir 
Indian States 
 
 
 
 
Punjab 
Haryana 
Himachal Pradesh 
 
 
 
New Delhi 
 
 
 
 
 
Sikkim 
 
 
 
 
Meghalaya 
 
 
Arunachal Pradesh 
 
Rajasthan Uttar Pradesh 
 
Assam 
 
Nagaland 
 
 
 
Gujarat 
 
 
 
Madhya Pradesh 
Bihar 
 
 
 
Bengal 
 
Manipur 
Mizoram 
 
 
Maharashtra 
 
Orissa 
Tripura 
 
 
Andhra Pradesh 
 
Goa 
 
Karnataka 
 
Tamil Nadu 
Kerala 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Political map of India. 
 
equilibria—one in which wages were low and children worked and another in which 
wages were high and children did not work; White (1996) studied the effects of 
globalization on child labour; and Mahmood et al. (1994) and Weiner (1991) examined 
the issues surrounding child labour in, respectively, Pakistan and India. Against this 
background, the purpose of this paper is to present econometric estimates and simu- 
lation results for a model of child welfare, the empirical base of which is data, recently 
released, for the Indian state of Madhya Pradesh (literally “Central Province”) and its 
districts. The accompanying maps (Figures 1 and 2) locate the state on the Indian 
sub-continent and identify its districts. 
Madhya Pradesh is the largest of the Indian states and, with a population of nearly 
70 million, is the sixth most populous. Nearly one-third of its area is forested (with 
teak, sal, bamboo and salai being particularly important), with another 46% devoted to 
agriculture. The state’s land use pattern is reflected in its employment structure: 52% 
of its main workers are cultivators with an additional 25% working as agricultural 
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Note: The following new districts were formed in 1998 
Morena District was divided into Morena and Sheopur in May 1998. 
Shahdol District was divided into Shahdol and Umariya in July 1998. 
Mandsaur District was divided into Mandsaur and Neemuch in July 1998. 
West Nimar (Khargone) District was divided into Khargone (West Nimar) and 
Barwani in May 1998. 
Hoshangabad District was divided into Hoshangabad and Harda in July 1998. 
Jabalpur District was divided into Jabalpur and Katni in May  1998. 
Mandla District was divided into Mandla and Dindori in May 1998. 
Surguja District was divided into Surguja and Koriya in May  1998. 
Bilaspur District was divided into Bilaspur, Korba and Janjgir-Champa in May 1998. 
Raigarh District was divided into Raigarh and Jashpur in May 1998. 
Rajnandgaon District was divided into Rajnandgaon and Kawardha in July 1998. 
Raipur District was divided into Raipur, Dhamtari and Mahasamund in July 1998. 
Bastar District was divided into Bastar, Kanker and Dantewada in May 1998. 
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Figure 2. Map of Madhya Pradesh. 
 
(including forestry) labourers. In addition to agriculture and forestry, livestock and 
poultry farming is an important economic activity. Although the state is rich in minerals 
these resources have not, as yet, been fully exploited and mining accounts for less than 
1% of the state’s workforce. 
The states of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh are, because of 
their low level of “human development”, pejoratively referred to in India by the 
acronym BIMARU.1 In all these states, levels of welfare for women and children are 
considerably lower than elsewhere in India and, in particular, they are characterized by: 
low rates of female literacy; high rates of child, infant and perinatal mortality; high rates 
of child participation; high fertility rates and a high proportion of higher-order births; 
and high rates of women dying during childbirth. To speak of these states as BIMARU 
states is, however, not to imply that they are content to remain so. The Government of 
Madhya Pradesh (1998), in particular, by publishing a Human Development Report for 
the state, containing inter alia a wealth of district-level data on the state, has both 
 
painted a detailed portrait of the state and also signalled its commitment to improving 
upon its current low level of human development. 
This report presents, for each of the state’s 45 districts, detailed data for 1991 under 
the following broad headings: human development indices; population; gender; health; 
education; basic amenities; land ownership and land use; food; employment; habitat; 
infrastructure and facilities. From this data, we know, for example: the proportion of 
houses in a district which were without adequate roofing or without electricity/water/ 
toilet facilities or did not have access to safe drinking water (habitat); the educational 
achievements of persons in different districts in terms of literacy and in terms of 
educational level (education); the health infrastructure in different districts in terms of 
the availability of medical facilities and the health status of persons in the districts 
(health); the district-wise proportions of children and women who worked (employ- 
ment); the average age of women at marriage and their childbearing experience by 
district (gender). In describing the data it should be stressed that these examples 
constitute but a small fraction of the material contained in the report. 
This paper uses some of the report’s data to analyse the welfare of children in 
Madhya Pradesh (MP). The analysis is underpinned by a seven-equation econometric 
model, the novelty of which is that it links the welfare of children to circumstances 
surrounding the lives of adults. These are: adult literacy, both male and female; the 
reproductive behaviour of women; the participation by women in the workforce; levels 
of poverty and inequality. All these circumstances interact so as to affect the mortality 
rates of children and their participation in the labour market. Thus, a common set of 
explanatory factors draws together the two, seemingly disparate, aspects of child 
welfare: mortality and participation. The joint analysis of child mortality and child 
participation contrasts with the fact that they have, as noted above, usually been studied 
as separate issues. The econometric framework offers the policy-maker a number of 
policy levers; hence policy simulations, using these estimates, explore the effects on 
child welfare, and on other related variables, of pulling these levers. The next section 
sets out the equation specifications. Section 4 discusses the estimation results, Section 
5 describes the policy simulations and Section 6 concludes the paper. 
The structure of the paper may be viewed in terms of three, overlapping, perspec- 
tives. The first is the specification of the econometric equations. Although “economic 
theory” provides the main guide to the specifications, it is deficient in two respects. 
First, theory may unambiguously predict the direction of the relationship between two 
variables but be unable to provide guidance as to the precise form of the variables. For 
example, on theoretical grounds, one might expect that women and children belonging 
to “badly-off” households would be more inclined to work than their counterparts in 
better-off households, without being able to say how “badly-off” ought to be defined. 
Making operational the concept of “badly-off” then becomes an empirical matter: it is 
very possible that a particular definition of being “badly-off” is empirically appropriate 
for women’s workforce participation but that a different definition is appropriate for 
explaining children’s participation. Second, theory may not even be able to offer an 
unambiguous guide to the direction of relationships. For example, literacy, by expand- 
ing employment opportunities, might mean that literate women were more likely to 
work than illiterate women; on the other hand, illiterate women by belonging to 
relatively more deprived households might, for reasons of need, be more likely to work. 
In such instances the direction of the relation is an empirical matter. 
The second aspect of the paper is to explore, through econometric estimation, the 
role of specific independent variables in determining the welfare of children. This 
aspect draws upon the general equation specifications but hones these specifications to 
 
 
give them an empirical “cutting-edge”. This essentially means three things. First, 
certain variables which a priori might have seemed important influences on child welfare 
could be found to be empirically insignificant. In effect, the original specifications are 
pared to their empirical essentials. Second, as noted above, general theoretical concepts 
are made operational by attaching to them specific, data-based, variables. In so doing, 
the variables that breathe life into a particular concept may differ from one context to 
another. The estimation of the equations reveals the nature of—though, not necessarily, 
the reasons for—these differences. Lastly, the theoretical indeterminacy of the direction 
of certain relationships is resolved empirically. In so doing it should be emphasized that 
this resolution is achieved through a measurement of the net effect of opposing forces: 
the econometric estimates are a comment on relative (X, pulling in one direction, is 
relatively more important than Y, pulling in another), not on absolute (X is important 
and Y is not), magnitudes. 
The third aspect of the paper is concerned with policy: what should policy-makers 
do to enhance the welfare of children? This question is sought to be answered through 
a sequence of simulations, with each successive simulation considering the effects of a 
change in a single policy instrument on children’s welfare, while incorporating the 
policy changes made in the preceding simulations. In particular, the simulations explore 
the effects of policies to: raise literacy rates; reduce poverty and inequality; and improve 
infrastructure, particularly in terms of improving access to safe drinking water and to 
health-centre facilities. These simulations draw upon the econometric specification and 
estimates in that the quantitative effect of a particular policy change depends upon how, 
and with what strength, the policy change feeds through the system. This, in turn, 
depends on the structure of the system as well as upon the econometric estimates that 
underpin the structure. 
 
2. The Econometric Model 
The econometric model used to analyse the welfare of children comprised seven 
equations whose dependent variables were: 
· children’s participation in the workforce as main or as marginal workers (CP1); 
· children’s participation in the workforce as main workers (CP2); 
· women’s participation in the workforce (FPR); 
· child mortality rate (CMR); 
· infant mortality rate (IMR); 
· births of order 4 or greater (BO4); 
· total fertility rate (TFR); 
The specification of these equations is discussed below. 
 
2.1 Children in the Workforce 
In 1991, nearly 1 million children in Madhya Pradesh (constituting 6% of its child 
population) were employed as main workers and another 350 000 children were 
employed as marginal workers. In total, therefore, 8% of children in Madhya Pradesh 
were working, either as main or as marginal workers. The child participation rate—that 
is, the percentage of children, 5–14 years of age, employed as main or marginal workers 
(CP1) or simply as main workers (CP2)—varied according to district. In Jhabua— 
which had the lowest per capita income in Madhya Pradesh, with nearly one-third of 
its population being below the poverty line, and where nearly 86% of the population 
 
belonged to the scheduled tribes—over 25% of children worked and 15% of children 
worked as main workers. On the other hand, in more prosperous districts, with 
relatively small scheduled tribe populations (Bhopal, Gwalior, Indore), less than 3% of 
children worked. This is consistent with the fact that the children of the non-poor 
seldom work, even in poor countries (Basu & Van, 1998). The participation rate of 
children in the workforce was, therefore, hypothesized to depend upon three factors: 
the economic need for children to work; parental awareness that children should not 
work; and “cultural” attitudes towards child labour. 
Economic need was regarded as depending upon three factors. First, it was assumed 
that in a household model of labour market participation, members of the household 
joined the workforce sequentially in the order: husband, wife, children. The basic 
motivation for women to work was economic necessity and, as a family’s economic 
necessity increased, children were also pressed into the workforce. Consequently, the 
expectation was that districts with high rates of women’s workforce participation (FPR) 
would also have high rates of child participation. The second factor determining the 
child participation rate was the level of poverty, with the expectation that districts with 
higher levels of poverty (POV)—as measured by the proportion of their population 
below the poverty line—would also have high participation rates. The third factor 
determining the need for children to work was through the importance, in agriculture, 
of child labour on small family-owned plots. The hypothesis was that the smaller the 
degree of inequality in the distribution of land2 (INQ), the greater would the preponder- 
ance of small holdings and, therefore, the higher would be the rate of child participation. 
In the context of child labour, it was the parents who decided whether or not a child 
worked. Awareness of the importance of full-time education for children was measured 
by the male and female literacy rates (LTM and LTF, respectively), the expectation 
being that districts with higher levels of literacy would have lower rates of child 
participation. Literacy rates for men and for women varied considerably by district: for 
example, Bastar, Jhabua, Guna, Rajgarh and Sarguja had low rates of literacy—with 
less than one in five female, and less than one in two male, literates—while in Bhopal, 
Indore, Gwalior and Jabalpur over 40% of the female population and over 70% of the 
male population were literate. 
Lastly, “cultural” attitudes towards child labour were proxied by the proportion of 
a district’s population that were from the “scheduled” tribes (ST) and from the 
“scheduled” castes (SC).3 Not only are persons belonging to these groups among the 
most disadvantaged in Indian society, but also they could, by virtue of their social and 
physical isolation, be justly described as being excluded from, or on the margins of, 
“mainstream” society. One consequence of such marginalization is that the cultural 
norms of scheduled caste and scheduled tribe persons could be, possibly are, different 
from those of caste Hindus. For example, it is accepted that, in Northern India, the 
patriarchal tradition—with all its unsavoury connotations in terms of inter alia female 
infanticide, child marriage, dowry—is stronger among the martial castes than among 
the scheduled castes (Dre`ze & Sen, 1999). Equally, it is possible that generations of 
poverty and oppression have not only dulled scheduled tribe/caste sensibilities to the 
undesirability of sending children to work, it may also have led to an atitutde where the 
desirability of children stems precisely from the fact that they represent a supply of 
labour. Needless to say, this view of children as a source of earnings, far from being 
unique to scheduled tribe/caste households, may also be that taken by poor caste 
Hindus. In terms of cultural attitudes towards child labour, the difference between 
scheduled tribes and scheduled castes on the one hand and “mainstream” society on 
the other that is being expressed here is one of degree, not of kind. 
Scheduled tribes and scheduled castes, in 1991, constituted, respectively, 23 and 
 
15% of the population in Madhya Pradesh and thus, in a very real sense, a sharp social 
cleavage separated a sizeable minority of the state’s population from the majority. 
Persons belonging to the scheduled tribes were relatively concentrated in a few districts: 
85% of the population in Jhabua, 67% of the Bastar population and over half the 
population in Dhar, Sarguja and Mandla were from the scheduled tribes, while 
scheduled tribe persons constituted less than one-tenth of the population in 15 of the 
45 districts in Madhya Pradesh. The distribution of scheduled castes was more even: 
in only eight of the 45 districts (these happening to be districts that were scheduled 
tribe-dominated) was the scheduled caste population share less than 10% and the 
highest scheduled caste population shares—in Datia, Ujjain and Chhatarpur—never 
exceeded 25% for any district. A characteristic of the scheduled tribe population in 
Madhya Pradesh, not shared by its scheduled caste population, is its low rate of 
urbanization—less than 5% of the scheduled tribe population, in contrast to 22% of 
scheduled caste population and 23% of the total population, lived in urban areas. 
Against this background, the equations for child participation were specified as: 
CP1i 5 a10 1 a11LTMi 1 a12LTFi 1 a13FPRi 1 a14POVi 1 a15INQi 1 a16SCi 1 a17STi 
1 u1i (1) 
CP2i 5 a20 1 a21LTMi 1 a22LTFi 1 a23FPRi 1 a24POVi 1 a25INQi 1 a26SCi 1 a27STi 
1 u2i (2) 
where the subscript i extended over the 45 districts of Madhya Pradesh and the u1i and 
u2i were the relevant error terms. 
 
2.2 Women in the Workforce 
In 1991, one-third of women, compared to 52% of men, in Madhya Pradesh were in 
the workforce. As with children, the worker participation rate of women (FPR) varied 
considerably by district from around 50% in certain districts (Jhabua, Rajnandgaon, 
Bastar) to around 10% in others (Bhind, Morena, Gwalior, Bhopal). Women’s partici- 
pation was hypothesized to depend upon the need and opportunity for employment, 
these factors underpinned by cultural attitudes towards women working. Need was 
measured by a district’s per capita income (YPC). It was expected that districts with 
lower levels of per capita income would have higher rates of female worker participation. 
Opportunity was measured by the fertility rate (TFR): the higher the fertility rate, the 
greater the demand that childcare would place on women’s time and, therefore, the 
smaller, in terms of availability for employment, would be their employment opportuni- 
ties. Consequently, districts characterized by relatively high fertility rates would have 
relatively low rates of women’s participation, though such an assertion needs to be 
qualified in two important respects. First, there is the possibility of working mothers 
using their older children—particularly girls—to look after their younger siblings; 
second, there is the possibility that the children of working women could accompany 
their mothers to the workplace. 
The female literacy rate (LTF) was also included as an explanatory variable in the 
women’s participation equation. On the one hand, higher rates of female literacy could 
be viewed as expanding employment opportunities for women. On the other hand, if 
women, at least in the cultural context of Madhya Pradesh, worked largely because they 
needed, rather than wanted, to work then women workers would, to a relatively greater 
degree, be drawn from the ranks of illiterate women since the burden of economic need 
could be reasonably expected to weigh relatively heavily on such women. For these 
reasons, while one might expect a significant association in the districts between their 
 
 
women’s participation and literacy rates, it is difficult to predict the direction of this 
association. A cultural anchor to the equation, in terms of social attitudes towards 
women’s participation, was provided by: (i) the SC and ST variables (discussed earlier); 
and (ii) two dummy variables, DUM and DUMB. The variable DUM 5 1 for Bhopal, 
Indore and Morena, where women’s participation, relative to other Madhya Pradesh 
districts, was low, DUM 5 0, elsewhere; and DUMB 5 1 for Bhind where women’s 
participation, relative to other Madhya Pradesh districts, was very low (4%), 
DUMB 5 0, elsewhere. These districts, possibly because their populations were largely 
of the martial castes (Kshatriya et al.), were characterized by a “fierce patriarchy” 
(Dre`ze & Sen, 1999), which inter  alia  frowned upon women working. These districts, 
therefore, represented outliers in the usual pattern of women’s workforce participation 
across the other districts of Madhya Pradesh. 
Against this background, the equation for the female worker participation rate was 
specified as: 
FPRi 5 a30 1 a31LTFi 1 a32YPCi 1 a33TFRi 1 a34SCi 1 a35STi 1 a36DUMi 1 a37DUMBi 
1 u3i (3) 
where the subscript i extended over the 45 districts of Madhya Pradesh and u3i was the 
error term associated with the equation. 
 
2.3 Child and Infant Mortality 
By any standards, child (CMR) and infant (IMR) mortality rates (defined, respectively, 
as mortality at age 5 and age 1, per 1000 of live births) in Madhya Pradesh are 
extremely high. Even more alarmingly, behind these high rates for the state as a whole, 
certain districts in Madhya Pradesh have even higher rates of child and infant mortality. 
Thus, in 1991, when the infant mortality rate in the state was 133 per thousand and the 
child mortality rate was 147 per thousand, seven districts had infant mortality rates in 
excess of 140 and 10 districts had child mortality rates in excess of 175. Both child and 
infant mortality rates were hypothesized to depend upon five factors: (i) the quality of 
the child/infant’s physical environment; (ii) the availability of medical facilities; (iii) the 
economic condition of households; (iv) the quality of maternal care received by the 
child/infant; and (v) cultural influences affecting mortality. 
The quality of the child’s physical environment was measured by two variables: the 
percentage of households in a district with access to safe drinking water (DRW) and the 
percentage of households in a district whose dwellings had “inadequate” roofing4 
(ROOF). The quality of roofing material is the most useful indicator of the degree of 
protection that households obtain from the weather and other external elements: 5% of 
households in Madhya Pradesh (though this was as high as 20% in Bastar and Bhind) 
lived in dwellings with inadequate roofing. The importance of access to safe drinking 
water does not need to be emphasized. In Madhya Pradesh, on average, 53% of 
households had access to safe drinking water and this comprised 80% of its urban 
households and 46% of its rural households. The average figure, however, masked 
considerable differences between the districts: only 27% of households in Jhabua, but 
89% of households in Gwalior and Indore, had access to safe drinking water. 
The availability of medical facilities in a district was measured by: (a) the number 
of health centres5 per 100 km2 (HCR); and (b) by the total number of medical beds per 
100 000 of its population (BED). The influence of economic conditions was measured 
by the poverty rate (POV), that is, the proportion of a district’s population that is 
“poor”. The quality of maternal care was hypothesized to depend upon the number of 
 
 
children mothers had to care for and the time that they were able to devote to their care. 
Consequently, districts where a relatively high percentage of births were of order 4 or 
more (BO4) and where a relatively high proportion of women worked (FPR) would be 
expected to have higher rates of mortality.6 Lastly, cultural influences were proxied by 
the proportion of a district’s population that belonged to the scheduled castes (SC) and 
scheduled tribes (ST). The mortality equations were, against the background of this 
discussion, specified as: 
CMRi 5 a40 1 a41DRWi 1 a42ROOFi 1 a43HCRi 1 a44BEDi 1 a45POVi 1 a46BO4i 
1 a47FPRi 1 a48SCi 1 a49STi 1 u4i (4) 
IMRi 5 a50 1 a51DRWi 1 a52ROOFi 1 a53HCRi 1 a54BEDi 1 a55POVi 1 a56BO4i 
1 a57FPRi 1 a58SCi 1 a59STi 1 u5i (5) 
where the subscript i extended over the 45 districts of Madhya Pradesh and u4i and u5i 
were the error terms associated with the equations. 
 
2.4 Fertility and Higher Order Births 
The total fertility rate (TFR), defined as the average number of births per woman, in 
a district and the share, in total births, of births of order 4 and above (BO4) entered as 
explanatory variables into, respectively, equation (3) and equations (4) and (5). The 
model was “closed” by specifying equations for these variables. Both the fertility rate 
and the share of higher order births were taken to depend on the same set of factors: 
districts with higher rates of female literacy would have lower fertility rates and a 
smaller proportion of higher order births; on the other hand, given the importance in 
poor families of children as “providers”, fertility rates and the share of higher order 
births would be high in districts with high poverty rates. Overlying these influences was 
the cultural effect of the presence, in a district’s population, of persons belonging to the 
scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes. The two equations were, accordingly, 
specified as: 
TFRi 5 a60 1 a61LTFi 1 a62POVi 1 a63SCi 1 a64STi 1 u6i (6) 
BO4i 5 a70 1 a71LTFi 1 a72POVi 1 a73SCi 1 a74STi 1 u7i (7) 
where the subscript i extended over the 45 districts of Madhya Pradesh and u6i and u7i 
were the error terms associated with the equations. 
 
3. Estimation Results 
Equations (1)–(7) were estimated by treating them as a system of seemingly unrelated 
regression equations7 (SURE). As is well known, when the equations do not contain the 
same set of explanatory variables and when the unobserveable and omitted factors in 
the individual equations (encapsulated in the error vectors, uj 5 {uji,    i 5 1,…,45}, 
j 5 1,…,7) are correlated across the equations, SURE estimates are more efficient than 
those obtained through ordinary least squares (OLS).8 Even if, in the absence of any 
cross-equation correlation between the error terms, there were no efficiency gains to be 
reaped, SURE estimation, unlike OLS, would allow the validity of cross-equation 
restrictions to be tested and, where appropriate, for such restrictions to be imposed. 
The estimation of the equation system ran into problems of multicollinearity with 
respect to two sets of variables: male and female literacy rates, whose estimated 
correlation coefficient was 0.88; and the scheduled tribe and scheduled caste district 
population shares, with an estimated correlation coefficient of 2 0.87. Consequently, 
 
 
when LTM and LTF were both used as explanatory variables in equations (1) and (2), 
and when SC and ST were both used as explanatory variables in equations (1)–(7), the 
results were not “sensible”,9 though any member of each pair, on its own, was 
statistically significant and plausibly signed. The solution that was adopted towards this 
problem was twofold. As regards the literacy rates, only the male literacy rate, LTM, 
was used in the child participation equations. This was done in the belief that, within 
the cultural context of Madhya Pradesh, the decision as to whether a child did or did 
not work was essentially made by the father. As regards the scheduled tribe/caste issue, 
two sets of results were obtained. The first set of results (shown in Table 1) controlled 
for the presence of scheduled tribes but not for scheduled castes (that is, used ST but 
not SC as one of the explanatory variables in equations (1)–(7)) and the second set of 
results (shown in Table 2) controlled for the presence of scheduled castes but not for 
scheduled tribes (that is, used SC but not ST as one of the explanatory variables in 
equations (1)–(7)). For both sets of results, the Breusch–Pagan test, with c
2 (21) values 
of 102.6 and 96.0, respectively, did not accept the null hypothesis that the error terms 
were uncorrelated across the equations and, therefore, justified the use of SURE 
estimation. 
It should be noted parenthetically that there was very little correlation between the 
four “deprivation” indicators used: POV; YPC; DRW; and ROOF. The correlation 
between the per capita income of the districts (YPC) and the proportion of their 
populations (POV) below the poverty line was 2 0.15; the correlation between the 
proportion of the population who lacked access to safe drinking water (DRW) and 
whose dwellings had inadequate roofing (ROOF) was 0.19; the only significantly large 
correlation was 0.55 between the per capita income of the districts and the proportion 
of their populations who lacked access to safe drinking water. 
 
3.1 Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled  Castes 
3.1.1 Worker participation. The top panels of Tables 1 and 2 show the summary 
statistics for the relevant set of equations beginning with the number of observations 
(45, which is the number of districts in Madhya Pradesh) for each equation and the 
number of parameters estimated (which varies by equation). The next statistic is the 
root mean square error (RMSE). This is the (square root of) average of the (squared) 
45 equation errors, where the error for a particular district is the difference between the 
actual and the predicted value of the dependent variable for that district. The R2 
statistic measures the goodness-of-fit and the c
2 statistic tests the null hypothesis that 
all the slope coefficients are zero; the latter hypothesis was, on the basis of the 
computed c
2 values, always rejected. Following the summary statistics are the equation- 
by-equation estimation results. 
The estimation results in Tables 1 and 2 show that the coefficients on the SC and 
the ST variables in all but two of the equations (1)–(7) were statistically significant but 
of opposing signs. This has two interesting implications. First, even after controlling for 
other (non-caste) factors, the proportionate presence of scheduled caste/tribe persons in 
a district exerted a significant influence on most of the dependent variables. Second, as 
Table 1 shows, the coefficient for ST was positive but the coefficient for SC was negative 
in equations (1)–(3). Ceteris paribus the presence of scheduled tribes was associated with 
higher, and that of scheduled castes with lower, female and child worker participation 
rates. This result can be understood in the context of the fact that the “untouchables” 
of the Indian caste system are those groups which have been recognized by the Indian 
government   as   belonging   to   the   “scheduled   castes”   (Delie`ge,   1996).   The 
 
Table 1. SURE estimation results: controlling for scheduled Tribes 
 
Equation Obs Parms RMSE R2q c2 
FPR 45 5 4.98 0.781 172.1 
CP1 45 4 1.45 0.878 331.1 
CP2 45 5 1.00 0.875 318.6 
CMR 45 4 17.74 0.607 97.1 
IMR 45 5 13.64 0.505 50.7 
BO4 45 3 3.97 0.398 44.7 
TFR 45 3 0.52 0.407 43.5 
 
 
 
FPR 
Standard 
Coefficient error z P . uzu [95% confidence interval] 
 
LTF 2 0.2417365 0.1065101 2 2.270 0.023 2 0.4504924 2 0.0329806 
TFR 2 4.915383 1.308398 2 3.757 0.000 2 7.479796 2 2.35097 
STR 0.2303166 0.0433767 5.310 0.000 0.1452997 0.3153334 
DUM 2 11.87277 2.761529 2 4.299 0.000 2 17.28526 2 6.460269 
DUMB 2 20.81958 4.57359 2 4.552 0.000 2 29.78365 2 11.85551 
CONS 59.33296 9.021787 6.577 0.000 41.65058 77.01533 
CP1 
LTM 2 0.0902388 0.02691 2 3.353 0.001 2 0.1429813 2 0.0374962 
FPR 0.1891524 0.026359 7.176 0.000 0.1374897 0.2408151 
INQ 2 21.4347 4.494664 2 4.769 0.000 2 30.24408 2 12.62532 
STR 0.0667312 0.0162179 4.115 0.000 0.0349447 0.0985177 
CONS 17.4727 2.460212 7.102 0.000 12.65077 22.29463 
CP2 
LTM 2 0.0268604 0.0191273 2 1.404 0.160 2 0.0643493 0.0106285 
FPR 0.1529512 0.0191316 7.995 0.000 0.115454 0.1904485 
INQ 2 16.22143 3.292603 2 4.927 0.000 2 22.67481 2 9.768047 
POV 0.0131709 0.0069317 1.900 0.057 2 0.000415 0.0267568 
STR 0.0449041 0.0116119 3.867 0.000 0.0221451 0.067663 
CONS 10.01996 1.771197 5.657 0.000 6.548482 13.49145 
CMR 
BO4 2.886765 0.4745884 6.083 0.000 1.956589 3.816941 
HCR 2 5.349351 2.426429 2 2.205 0.027 2 10.10507 2 0.593637 
BED 2 0.0500805 0.0116247 2 4.308 0.000 2 0.0728644 2 0.0272966 
POV 0.2587179 0.2109244 1.227 0.220 2 0.1546862 0.672122 
CONS 100.3963 21.99521 4.564 0.000 57.28644 143.5061 
IMR 
DRW 2 0.2949712 0.1013091 2 2.912 0.004 2 0.4935334 2 0.0964089 
BED 2 0.0264058 0.009241 2 2.857 0.004 2 0.0445178 2 0.0082938 
POV 0.6451259 0.1671119 3.860 0.000 0.3175927 0.9726592 
FPR 0.6447227 0.2143018 3.008 0.003 0.2246989 1.064747 
STR 2 0.4546454 0.1253602 2 3.627 0.000 2 0.700347 2 0.2089439 
CONS 117.324 9.554506 12.279 0.000 98.5975 136.0505 
BO4 
LTF 2 0.4138496 0.0636364 2 6.503 0.000 2 0.5385747 2 0.2891246 
POV 0.1432651 0.0481143 2.978 0.003 0.0489627 0.2375675 
STR 2 0.1439205 0.0339739 2 4.236 0.000 2 0.2105081 2 0.0773329 
CONS 43.0122 2.199829 19.553 0.000 38.70061 47.32378 
TFR       
LTF 2 0.0534528 0.0083776 2 6.380 0.000 2 0.0698727 2 0.037033 
POV 0.0139704 0.006777 2.061 0.039 0.0006877 0.0272531 
STR 2 0.019192 0.0044762 2 4.288 0.000 2 0.0279652 2 0.0104188 
CONS 6.445744 0.2915972 22.105 0.000 5.874224 7.017264 
 
Table 2. SURE estimation results: controlling for scheduled castes 
 
Equation Obs Parms RMSE R2 c2 
FPR 45 5 4.69 0.806 194.6   
CP1 45 4 1.51 0.867 297.7   
CP2 45 5 1.03 0.866 294.5   
CMR 45 4 17.80 0.604 99.5   
IMR 45 5 14.12 0.469 40.4   
BO4 45 3 3.81 0.447 50.6   
TFR 45 3 0.52 0.408 42.9   
  
Coefficient 
Standard 
error 
  
z 
 
P . uzu 
 
[95% confidence interval] 
FPR       
LTF 2 0.35694 0.0940288  2 3.796 0.000 2 0.5412331 2 0.172647 
TFR 2 4.566548 1.268713  2 3.599 0.000 2 7.05318 2 2.079917 
SCS 2 0.8391908 0.1374226  2 6.107 0.000 2 1.108534 2 0.5698475 
DUM 2 11.77646 2.675439  2 4.402 0.000 2 17.02023 2 6.532699 
DUMH 2 20.95545 4.42077  2 4.740 0.000 2 29.62 2 12.2909 
CONS 78.57021 7.472166  10.515 0.000 63.92503 93.21538 
CP1        
1TM 2 0.1335611 0.0252419 2 5.291 0.000 2 0.1830343 2 0.0840879 
FPR 0.1935909 0.0277444 6.978 0.000 0.1392128 0.2479689 
INQ 2 22.25014 4.744821 2 4.689 0.000 2 31.54981 2 12.95046 
SCS 2 0.1693793 0.0517766 2 3.271 0.001 2 0.2708596 2 0.067899 
CONS 24.28216 2.842549 8.542 0.000 18.71086 29.85345 
CP2         
1TM 2 0.0560241 0.0177046 2 3.164 0.002 2 0.0907244 2 0.0213238 
FPR 0.1557809 0.0198272 7.857 0.000 0.1169203 0.1946415 
INQ 2 16.93929 3.431519 2 4.936 0.000 2 23.66494 2 10.21363 
POV 0.0133583 0.0069123 1.933 0.053 2 0.0001895 0.0269061 
SCS 2 0.1181457 0.0364066 2 3.245 0.001 2 0.1895014 2 0.04679 
CONS 14.757 2.044125 7.219 0.000 10.75059 18.76342 
CMR         
BO4 2.990864 0.4733284 6.319 0.000 2.063158 3.918571 
HCR 2 5.304398 2.438809 2 2.175 0.030 2 10.08438 2 0.5244207 
BED 2 0.0494569 0.011753 2 4.208 0.000 2 0.0724923 2 0.0264215 
POV 0.262315 0.2111302 1.242 0.214 2 0.1514926 0.6761226 
CONS 96.34992 21.91877 4.396 0.000 53.38992 139.3099 
IMR         
DRW 2 0.2420815 0.1048295 2 2.309 0.021 2 0.4475435 2 0.0366195 
BED 2 0.0261955 0.0096349 2 2.719 0.007 2 0.0450795 2 0.0073115 
POV 0.6691267 0.1763461 3.794 0.000 0.3234947 1.014759 
FPR 0.4626693 0.2143486 2.158 0.031 0.0425539 0.8827848 
SCS 1.28423 0.4567151 2.812 0.005 0.3890854 2.179376 
CONS 89.96746 16.35737 5.500 0.000 57.90759 122.0273 
BO4         
LTF 2 0.3457935 0.0561621 2 6.157 0.000 2 0.4558691 2 0.2357179 
POV 0.1374508 0.0470739 2.920 0.004 0.0451878 0.2297139 
SCS 0.5063591 0.1085443 4.665 0.000 0.2936162 0.7191021 
CONS 30.47301 2.758164 11.048 0.000 25.06711 35.87892 
TFR         
LTF 2 0.0440111 0.0076507 2 5.753 0.000 2 0.0590062 2 0.0290159 
POV 0.012797 0.0067946 1.883 0.060 2 0.0005202 0.0261141 
SCS 0.0615849 0.014916 4.129 0.000 0.0323501 0.0908197 
CONS 4.866888 0.3851994 12.635 0.000 4.111911 5.621864 
 
 
“untouchability” of these groups derived from their occupational association with death 
and organic waste and, given the dependence of these groups on the higher castes 
(Bailey, 1960) for employment, water, irrigation, housing, etc. this greatly limits the 
type of employment that is available to scheduled caste women and children. In 
particular, it rules out any employment where there is the need for, or possibility of, 
physical contact—albeit indirectly—between the employer and the  employee.10 
On the other hand, although orthodox Hindus regard some scheduled tribes as 
“untouchables” this would be directed towards those tribes who ate beef and pork. For 
example, the Bhils (who are an important scheduled tribe of Madhya Pradesh, concen- 
trated in Jhabua district) are sufficiently integrated into mainstream Hindu society for 
their more aristocratic segments to be able to employ Brahmin priests. So, in terms of 
untouchability, scheduled tribes are less handicapped than are the scheduled castes. 
Persons belonging to the scheduled tribes in Madhya Pradesh have the further advan- 
tage over scheduled caste persons in that the scheduled tribes are highly concentrated 
in certain districts. This concentration gives them an occupational independence which 
the scheduled castes, who are more dispersed over the state, do not enjoy. For example, 
most tribals engage in agriculture, using the primitive “slash-and-burn” (jhum) method, 
but the scheduled castes, who are excluded from land-ownership, depend upon higher 
caste land owners for employment as labourers. For all these reasons, while women and 
children from both scheduled caste and scheduled tribe families might need to work, 
employment opportunities for scheduled caste women and children, compared with 
opportunities for women and children from the scheduled tribes are relatively 
restricted. 
 
 
3.1.2 Child and infant mortality. The second interesting implication of the scheduled 
tribe/scheduled caste divide is with regard to child and infant mortality. As Tables 1 
and 2 show, the coefficient on ST was significantly negative, but the coefficient on SC 
was significantly positive, in the infant mortality equation. This implies that, in terms 
of a district’s population, a proportionately higher presence of scheduled tribes would 
ceteris paribus be associated with lower rates of infant mortality and a proportionately 
higher presence of scheduled castes would be associated with higher rates of infant 
mortality. 
Children in poor families need to work in order to raise their family income above 
subsistence level. Where children are able to work—as in tribal families with their 
reliance on family-based agriculture for their livelihood—they are an asset and, in 
the allocation of family resources, emphasis is placed on their “good health”. 
Where children are unable to find work because their employment opportunities are 
highly limited—as with children of scheduled caste families—family income falls below 
subsistence level and infant mortality rates are high. 
 
 
3.2 Poverty and Inequality 
The above discussion leads very naturally into a discussion about the roles of poverty 
and inequality in determining the welfare of children. The econometric estimates 
unambiguously showed that, after controlling for other factors, districts with relatively 
high poverty rates also had relatively high rates of child and of infant mortality. In 
addition to its effects upon mortality rates, poverty was associated with larger families: 
ceteris paribus districts with relatively high poverty rates had relatively high fertility rates 
and a relatively greater proportion, in total births, of higher order births. One expla- 
 
nation for the last result is that since children hold out the promise of improving family 
fortunes through their labour—either as children, adolescents or adults—the greater the 
level of poverty in a district, the more widespread would be the desire for more, rather 
than less, children. 
The role of inequality (in the distribution of land) in affecting children’s welfare was 
both similar and different from that of poverty, discussed above. Greater equality in the 
distribution of land increased the preponderance, in agriculture, of small family hold- 
ings and, since the labour of children is an important input in the operation of these 
holdings, raised the workforce participation rate of children.11 In this respect, increased 
equality, like higher levels of poverty, reduced the welfare of children. 
 
 
3.3 Male and Female Literacy Rates 
Male literacy rates had a significantly negative effect on children’s workforce partici- 
pation as main or as marginal workers. The male literacy effect continued to be 
significant for children as main workers when scheduled castes were controlled for 
(Table 2). However, when scheduled tribes were controlled for (Table 1), the male 
literacy variable, though adding to the explanatory power of equation (2), was not 
significantly different from zero. This suggests that when children participated as main 
workers they did so because of overwhelming economic need, hence a rise in the male 
literacy rates with, presumably, a concomitant increase in the awareness of educating 
children was not sufficient to obviate this. Alternatively, it could be that, in districts 
where scheduled tribes were an important part of the population, children who were 
main workers came from different (plausibly, worse-off) families than children who 
were marginal workers and that inter-district variations in male literacy rates did not 
affect fathers of the former—most of these men being illiterate, whatever their district 
of residence—but they did affect fathers of the latter. 
Earlier, the effect on female workforce participation of higher female literacy levels 
was viewed agnostically. The estimates show that (irrespective of whether scheduled 
tribes or scheduled castes were controlled for) districts with higher rates of female 
literacy had lower rates of female participation. This suggests that women in Madhya 
Pradesh worked because they needed to rather than because they wanted to. Literate 
women were more likely to belong to relatively prosperous families and, therefore, less 
inclined to work. The effect of female literacy on mortality rates was indirect and 
operated through two channels: first, higher rates of literacy reduced the proportion, in 
total births, of higher order births and this, in turn, led to lower rates of child mortality; 
second, higher female literacy rates were associated with lower rates of female worker 
participation (both independently and through reductions in the total fertility rate) and 
this, in turn, led to lower rates of infant mortality. 
 
 
3.4 Health Facilities 
The availability of safe drinking water significantly reduced the infant mortality rate, 
though it did not have a significant affect on child mortality. Neither mortality rate was 
significantly affected by the absence of adequate roofing. The availability of health- 
centre beds in a district played a significant role in reducing its child and infant 
mortality rates, but access to health centres was significant only in reducing the child 
mortality rate. 
 
4. Policy Simulations 
The preceding discussion suggested a number of policy instruments for improving the 
welfare of children. This section uses the econometric estimates shown in Table 1 (that 
is, after controlling for the presence of persons from the scheduled tribes, since these 
constituted nearly one-quarter of the state’s population) to assess, through a sequence 
of policy simulations, the efficacy of these instruments in achieving these ends.12 The 
policy instruments considered were: 
· Simulation 1: Improving literacy rates, in every district, by 8% for men and 45% for 
women.13 
· Simulation 2: Reducing, by 25%, the poverty rate in every district. 
· Simulation 3: Reducing, by 5%, the value of the Gini coefficient in every district. 
· Simulation 4: Ensuring that in every district 90% of households had access to safe 
drinking water. 
· Simulation 5: Increasing, in every district, the number of health centres per 100 km2 
by 5% and the number of beds per 100 000 of population by 20%. 
 
It should be emphasized that these simulations were cumulative so that each step 
incorporated the changes made in the earlier simulations: the difference between two 
successive simulations then measured the effect of the latest policy change.14 Since the 
equation system had recursive aspects, in that some of the dependent variables entered 
as explanatory variables in other equations,15 the simulations were designed as follows. 
First, equations (6) and (7) were used to compute the values of TFR and BO4 under 
the different policy scenarios of simulations 1–5. The computed value of TFR was then 
used as the value of the explanatory variable in the relevant simulation for FPR 
(equation (3)) and the computed value of BO4 was similarly used for CMR (equation 
(4)). The computed value of FPR that emerged from these simulations was then used 
as the value of the explanatory variable in the relevant simulation for CP1 and CP2 
(equations (1) and (2)). 
Tables 3–9, respectively, show the effect of these simulations (under columns 
S1–S5) on: the fertility rate (TFR: Table 3); births of order 4 or more (BO4: Table 4); 
women’s workforce participation rate (FPR: Table 5); children’s workforce partici- 
pation rate as main or marginal workers (CP1: Table 6); children’s workforce 
participation rate as main workers (CP2: Table 7); child mortality rate (CMR: Table 
8); infant mortality rate (IMR: Table 9). In each table, the columns headed AC and PR 
show, respectively, the sample, and predicted, values of the relevant variable for the 
various districts. The predicted values under the PR column use, in all the equations, 
the sample values of the relevant explanatory variables. The values under the column 
headed S0 show the predicted values computed by taking account of the recursive 
nature of the model, described above, but without altering the values of the policy 
instruments from their sample values. In other words, the predicted values under S0 are 
computed using the predicted values of TFR, BO4 and FPR in the relevant equations. 
These values under the S0 column should, therefore, be viewed as the base simulation 
values against which the results shown under the subsequent columns are to be 
compared. 
Comparing columns S0 and S1 of Tables 3 and 4 shows that raising the female 
literacy rate (simulation 1) reduced the fertility rate and the incidence of higher order 
births. From equation (3), the reduced fertility rate raised female workforce partici- 
pation but, the higher female literacy rate independently reduced the female participation 
rate. Consequently, the net effect of an increase in the female literacy rate on female 
 
Table 3. Simulation results for total fertility rates: controlling for scheduled 
tribes 
 
District AC PR SO S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
Balaghat 3.9 4.6 4.6 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
Bastar 4.5 4.7 4.7 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2 
Betul 5.3 4.8 4.8 4.0 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 
Bhind 5.6 5.2 5.2 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 
Bhopal 4.8 4.0 4.0 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 
Bilaspur 4.7 5.0 5.0 4.4 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2 
Chhatarpur 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.1 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Chhindwara 5.2 4.5 4.5 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 
Damoh 5.1 5.4 5.4 4.6 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 
Datia 5.1 5.4 5.4 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 
Dewas 4.9 5.2 5.2 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 
Dhar 5 4.6 4.6 4.1 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Durg 4.2 4.3 4.3 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 
Guna 5.9 5.5 5.5 5.1 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Gwalior 4.9 4.5 4.5 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 
Hshbad 4.7 4.7 4.7 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 
Indore 3.8 3.9 3.9 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Jabalpur 4.6 4.3 4.3 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 
Jhabua 5.7 4.6 4.6 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2 
Mandla 4.1 4.8 4.8 4.3 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 
Mandsaur 4.1 5.2 5.2 4.5 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 
Morena 6.6 5.5 5.5 5.0 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 
Narsmpur 4 4.3 4.3 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 
NimarE 5.2 4.9 4.9 4.2 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
NimarW 5.1 5.4 5.4 4.8 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 
Panna 5.7 5.5 5.5 5.0 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 
Raigarh 4 4.5 4.5 3.9 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 
Raipur 4.3 4.8 4.8 4.1 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Raisen 6.1 5.3 5.3 4.7 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 
Rajgarh 5.2 5.9 5.9 5.6 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 
Rajnangn 4.2 4.9 4.9 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 
Ratlam 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.0 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 
Rewa 5.6 5.2 5.2 4.5 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 
Sagar 5.5 5.0 5.0 4.1 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 
Sarguja 4.3 5.0 5.0 4.6 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 
Satna 5.5 5.1 5.1 4.4 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 
Sehore 5.2 5.5 5.5 5.0 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 
Seoni 4.3 4.6 4.6 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 
Shahdol 5 4.9 4.9 4.5 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 
Shajapur 5 5.6 5.6 5.2 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 
Shivpuri 5.4 5.6 5.6 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 
Sidhi 6 5.6 5.6 5.3 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 
Tikamgarh 6.2 5.6 5.6 5.1 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Ujjain 4.2 4.9 4.9 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 
Vidisha 5.6 5.4 5.4 4.7 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 
 
workforce participation depended upon the opposing strengths of the “indirect” and 
“direct” effects of higher female literacy. As Table 5 shows, in all the districts, the net 
effect was to raise the participation rate very slightly or, in other words, the strength of 
the direct effect was fractionally less than that of the indirect effect. 
From equation (4), the rise in female literacy, acting through the reduced pro- 
portion of higher order births, reduced the child mortality rate in all the districts (Table 
 
 
Table 4. Simulation results for higher order births: controlling for scheduled 
tribes 
 
 District AC PR S0 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
Balaghat 22.9 30.2 30.2 23.0 21.4 21.4 21.4 21.4 
Bastar 30.2 30.6 30.6 27.7 26.8 26.8 26.8 26.8 
Betul 37.7 33.0 33.0 26.7 24.3 24.3 24.3 24.3 
Bhind 37.1 34.3 34.3 29.0 28.3 28.3 28.3 28.3 
Bhopal 30 25.4 25.4 15.3 14.0 14.0 14.0 14.0 
Bilaspur 31.8 33.2 33.2 28.1 26.9 26.9 26.9 26.9 
Chhatarpur 42.2 37.2 37.2 33.2 32.3 32.3 32.3 32.3 
Chhindwara 34.8 29.1 29.1 23.0 21.9 21.9 21.9 21.9 
Damoh 35.8 36.5 36.5 30.9 28.9 28.9 28.9 28.9 
Datia 35 35.5 35.5 31.1 30.4 30.4 30.4 30.4 
Dewas 30.7 34.1 34.1 29.3 28.4 28.4 28.4 28.4 
Dhar 32.1 29.9 29.9 26.0 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 
Durg 25.1 27.6 27.6 19.6 18.6 18.6 18.6 18.6 
Guna 37.8 36.4 36.4 33.1 32.4 32.4 32.4 32.4 
Gwalior 28.9 28.8 28.8 21.0 20.2 20.2 20.2 20.2 
Hshbad 35.3 30.6 30.6 23.6 22.2 22.2 22.2 22.2 
Indore 23.1 24.8 24.8 14.9 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.7 
Jabalpur 31.9 27.9 27.9 19.5 18.0 18.0 18.0 18.0 
Jhabua 39.7 30.4 30.4 28.2 27.1 27.1 27.1 27.1 
Mandla 24 32.8 32.8 28.6 26.7 26.7 26.7 26.7 
Mandsaur 27.1 34.0 34.0 28.8 27.9 27.9 27.9 27.9 
Morena 41.4 36.5 36.5 32.7 31.9 31.9 31.9 31.9 
Narsmpur 27.9 27.2 27.2 19.5 18.6 18.6 18.6 18.6 
NimarE 34.4 33.3 33.3 27.4 25.6 25.6 25.6 25.6 
NimarW 34.4 37.6 37.6 33.3 30.5 30.5 30.5 30.5 
Panna 34.2 36.2 36.2 32.6 31.8 31.8 31.8 31.8 
Raigarh 25 29.3 29.3 24.4 23.3 23.3 23.3 23.3 
Raipur 29.4 31.3 31.3 25.5 24.6 24.6 24.6 24.6 
Raisen 34.6 35.3 35.3 30.5 29.3 29.3 29.3 29.3 
Rajgarh 34.2 40.2 40.2 37.3 36.2 36.2 36.2 36.2 
Rajnangn 26 32.0 32.0 26.8 25.8 25.8 25.8 25.8 
Ratlam 29.8 30.3 30.3 24.9 24.2 24.2 24.2 24.2 
Rewa 37.4 34.3 34.3 29.3 28.3 28.3 28.3 28.3 
Sagar 38.9 33.6 33.6 26.5 24.7 24.7 24.7 24.7 
Sarguja 30.1 33.3 33.3 30.1 28.8 28.8 28.8 28.8 
Satna 34.4 33.6 33.6 28.5 27.4 27.4 27.4 27.4 
Sehore 36.4 37.3 37.3 33.2 32.0 32.0 32.0 32.0 
Seoni 28.8 30.1 30.1 24.3 23.0 23.0 23.0 23.0 
Shahdol 33.4 32.8 32.8 29.1 27.9 27.9 27.9 27.9 
Shajapur 32.3 37.5 37.5 33.9 33.1 33.1 33.1 33.1 
Shivpuri 40.3 37.2 37.2 34.3 33.7 33.7 33.7 33.7 
Sidhi 39.8 38.2 38.2 35.7 34.4 34.4 34.4 34.4 
Tikamgarh 38 37.2 37.2 33.5 32.7 32.7 32.7 32.7 
Ujjain 28.7 32.1 32.1 26.0 25.3 25.3 25.3 25.3 
 Vidisha 41.4 35.8 35.8 30.6 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4 
 
8) and this reduction was quite substantial. The rise in female literacy, however, to a 
very small degree, raised the infant mortality rate (Table 9) and this was because, as 
observed in the previous paragraph, the higher female literacy rate—acting through the 
fertility rate—raised, very slightly, the rate of female workforce participation, leading to 
a fall in the amount of maternal care. Raising the male literacy rate lowered the child 
participation rate but this effect was dampened by the fact that simultaneously raising 
 
 
Table 5. Simulation results for female workforce participation rate: 
controlling for scheduled tribes 
 
District AC PR S0 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
Balaghat 45 35.8 32.5 32.8 33.6 33.6 33.6 33.6 
Bastar 49 49.0 48.1 48.3 48.7 48.7 48.7 48.7 
Betul 40 33.7 36.0 36.4 37.5 37.5 37.5 37.5 
Bhind 4 4.4 6.3 6.5 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 
Bhopal 14 11.5 15.4 15.9 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 
Bilaspur 37 34.9 33.4 33.7 34.2 34.2 34.2 34.2 
Chhatarpur 29 27.5 27.6 27.8 28.3 28.3 28.3 28.3 
Chhindwara 34 33.9 37.4 37.7 38.2 38.2 38.2 38.2 
Damoh 28 29.8 28.5 28.8 29.8 29.8 29.8 29.8 
Datia 20 28.9 27.5 27.7 28.0 28.0 28.0 28.0 
Dewas 30 32.5 31.2 31.5 31.9 31.9 31.9 31.9 
Dhar 40 42.1 44.0 44.2 44.5 44.5 44.5 44.5 
Durg 37 31.2 30.6 31.0 31.5 31.5 31.5 31.5 
Guna 21 28.7 30.7 30.9 31.2 31.2 31.2 31.2 
Gwalior 11 14.0 15.9 16.3 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 
Hshbad 23 31.1 31.4 31.7 32.4 32.4 32.4 32.4 
Indore 16 17.2 16.4 16.9 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 
Jabalpur 23 30.0 31.5 31.9 32.7 32.7 32.7 32.7 
Jhabua 52 48.3 53.6 53.7 54.2 54.2 54.2 54.2 
Mandla 47 47.8 44.2 44.4 45.3 45.3 45.3 45.3 
Mandsaur 38 33.4 28.2 28.4 28.8 28.8 28.8 28.8 
Morena 12 11.3 16.6 16.8 17.2 17.2 17.2 17.2 
Narsmpur 25 32.6 31.1 31.5 31.9 31.9 31.9 31.9 
NimarE 34 32.3 33.6 33.9 34.7 34.7 34.7 34.7 
NimarW 39 39.3 37.9 38.2 39.5 39.5 39.5 39.5 
Panna 29 30.1 31.3 31.4 31.9 31.9 31.9 31.9 
Raigarh 41 44.3 41.7 42.0 42.5 42.5 42.5 42.5 
Raipur 41 34.9 32.4 32.7 33.2 33.2 33.2 33.2 
Raisen 22 26.5 30.5 30.8 31.3 31.3 31.3 31.3 
Rajgarh 38 30.8 27.1 27.2 27.7 27.7 27.7 27.7 
Rajnangn 50 37.8 34.5 34.7 35.2 35.2 35.2 35.2 
Ratlam 37 34.6 34.5 34.8 35.1 35.1 35.1 35.1 
Rewa 29 28.2 30.2 30.5 31.0 31.0 31.0 31.0 
Sagar 26 25.1 27.7 28.0 28.9 28.9 28.9 28.9 
Sarguja 38 46.4 42.9 43.1 43.7 43.7 43.7 43.7 
Satna 30 28.8 30.7 31.0 31.5 31.5 31.5 31.5 
Sehore 32 30.8 29.1 29.3 29.9 29.9 29.9 29.9 
Seoni 44 39.2 37.8 38.1 38.7 38.7 38.7 38.7 
Shahdol 33 40.6 40.8 41.0 41.6 41.6 41.6 41.6 
Shajapur 35 30.5 27.4 27.6 27.9 27.9 27.9 27.9 
Shivpuri 30 31.6 30.5 30.7 31.0 31.0 31.0 31.0 
Sidhi 34 33.6 35.3 35.4 36.1 36.1 36.1 36.1 
Tikamgarh 33 25.0 27.9 28.1 28.5 28.5 28.5 28.5 
Ujjain 26 31.3 27.6 27.9 28.3 28.3 28.3 28.3 
Vidisha 21 26.1 27.3 27.6 28.2 28.2 28.2 28.2 
 
the female literacy rate raised, as discussed above, the female participation rate and 
therefore pushed up the child participation rate. 
Reducing the poverty rate (simulation 2) had several effects. First, via equations (6) 
and (7), it lowered the fertility rate and the incidence of higher order births (Tables 3 
and 4). The reduction in fertility rates increased, via equation (3), the female workforce 
participation rate (Table 5) and, in turn, this increased the child participation rate 
 
Table 6. Simulation results for children’s workforce participation rate, main 
or marginal: controlling for scheduled tribes 
 
District AC PR SO S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
Balaghat 6.7 5.9 3.5 3.1 3.3 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Bastar 17.7 15.9 15.7 15.5 15.6 16.2 16.2 16.2 
Betul 13.8 10.7 9.9 9.6 9.8 10.4 10.4 10.4 
Bhind 1.7 1.3 1.7 1.3 1.4 1.9 1.9 1.9 
Bhopal 2.5 2.6 2.9 2.5 2.6 3.1 3.1 3.1 
Bilaspur 6.5 7.5 6.8 6.4 6.5 7.1 7.1 7.1 
Chhatarpur 8.5 8.0 7.8 7.5 7.5 8.1 8.1 8.1 
Chhindwara 10.5 10.0 10.6 10.3 10.4 10.9 10.9 10.9 
Damoh 6.4 5.6 5.7 5.3 5.5 6.1 6.1 6.1 
Datia 4.8 4.9 6.3 5.9 5.9 6.5 6.5 6.5 
Dewas 6.2 7.2 7.4 7.0 7.1 7.7 7.7 7.7 
Dhar 11.4 13.4 14.2 13.9 14.0 14.5 14.5 14.5 
Durg 5.5 6.2 5.0 4.5 4.6 5.2 5.2 5.2 
Guna 5.4 6.3 8.1 7.8 7.8 8.4 8.4 8.4 
Gwalior 2.9 1.7 2.7 2.2 2.3 2.9 2.9 2.9 
Hshbad 5.9 5.4 7.0 6.6 6.8 7.3 7.3 7.3 
Indore 3.1 2.3 2.4 1.9 2.0 2.6 2.6 2.6 
Jabalpur 3.8 4.4 6.0 5.5 5.7 6.3 6.3 6.3 
Jhabua 25.5 20.8 21.1 20.9 21.0 21.5 21.5 21.5 
Mandla 10.3 13.8 13.2 12.9 13.1 13.7 13.7 13.7 
Mandsaur 9.3 8.1 6.3 5.8 5.9 6.4 6.4 6.4 
Morena 3.8 4.3 5.2 4.8 4.9 5.4 5.4 5.4 
Narsmpur 5.4 6.0 7.2 6.8 6.9 7.4 7.4 7.4 
NimarE 10.6 10.0 10.0 9.6 9.8 10.3 10.3 10.3 
NimarW 12.6 13.5 13.3 13.0 13.2 13.8 13.8 13.8 
Panna 7.9 8.5 9.0 8.7 8.7 9.3 9.3 9.3 
Raigarh 9.7 11.3 11.5 11.1 11.2 11.8 11.8 11.8 
Raipur 7.6 8.3 6.7 6.3 6.3 7.0 7.0 7.0 
Raisen 4.9 6.4 8.0 7.7 7.8 8.4 8.4 8.4 
Rajgarh 11.2 9.2 7.1 6.8 6.9 7.5 7.5 7.5 
Rajnangn 11.2 11.2 8.2 7.9 7.9 8.5 8.5 8.5 
Ratlam 12 9.8 9.3 8.9 9.0 9.6 9.6 9.6 
Rewa 5.5 4.7 5.0 4.6 4.7 5.4 5.4 5.4 
Sagar 5.3 4.8 5.1 4.7 4.8 5.4 5.4 5.4 
Sarguja 11.1 13.0 13.9 13.6 13.7 14.3 14.3 14.3 
Satna 5.8 6.1 6.3 5.9 6.0 6.6 6.6 6.6 
Sehore 6.6 7.9 7.3 6.9 7.0 7.6 7.6 7.6 
Seoni 10.7 11.0 9.9 9.5 9.6 10.2 10.2 10.2 
Shahdol 7.9 9.8 11.3 11.0 11.1 11.7 11.7 11.7 
Shajapur 8.4 7.5 6.1 5.7 5.7 6.3 6.3 6.3 
Shivpuri 8 9.2 9.3 9.0 9.0 9.5 9.5 9.5 
Sidhi 8.5 8.9 9.2 8.9 9.0 9.7 9.7 9.7 
Tikamgarh 7.7 9.6 8.6 8.3 8.4 8.9 8.9 8.9 
Ujjain 6.6 5.2 5.6 5.1 5.2 5.8 5.8 5.8 
Vidisha 5.5 4.6 5.8 5.4 5.5 6.1 6.1 6.1 
 
 
(Tables 6 and 7). But the reduction in the poverty rate also had a direct effect (equation 
(2)) on reducing the child participation rate as main workers. The lower incidence of 
higher order births reduced, via equation (4), the child mortality rate (Table 8). 
Second, via equations (4) and (5), lower rates of poverty had a direct impact in lowering 
child and infant mortality rates (Tables 8 and 9). Reducing the degree of inequality in 
 
Table 7. Simulation results for children’s workforce participation rate, main: 
controlling for scheduled tribes 
 
District AC PR S0 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
Balaghat 5 5.0 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.5 3.5 3.5 
Bastar 13.4 10.7 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.9 10.9 10.9 
Betul 11.2 8.3 7.7 7.6 7.6 8.0 8.0 8.0 
Bhind 1.5 0.8 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Bhopal 1.8 2.4 2.6 2.6 2.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Bilaspur 4.7 5.7 5.2 5.1 5.1 5.5 5.5 5.5 
Chhatarpur 5.5 5.4 5.2 5.1 5.1 5.5 5.5 5.5 
Chhindwara 7.9 7.3 7.8 7.7 7.7 8.1 8.1 8.1 
Damoh 4.9 4.5 4.6 4.5 4.4 4.9 4.9 4.9 
Datia 2.9 3.4 4.5 4.4 4.4 4.8 4.8 4.8 
Dewas 4.8 5.3 5.5 5.4 5.4 5.8 5.8 5.8 
Dhar 8.7 9.3 9.9 9.9 9.8 10.3 10.3 10.3 
Durg 4.8 5.2 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.6 4.6 4.6 
Guna 3.7 3.9 5.4 5.3 5.3 5.8 5.8 5.8 
Gwalior 2.3 1.5 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Hshbad 4.3 4.3 5.6 5.5 5.5 5.9 5.9 5.9 
Indore 2.7 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.7 2.7 2.7 
Jabalpur 2.9 3.8 5.1 5.0 5.0 5.4 5.4 5.4 
Jhabua 15.2 14.1 14.3 14.3 14.2 14.6 14.6 14.6 
Mandla 8.5 10.2 9.8 9.7 9.7 10.1 10.1 10.1 
Mandsaur 7.4 6.4 4.9 4.8 4.8 5.2 5.2 5.2 
Morena 3.1 2.8 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.8 3.8 3.8 
Narsmpur 4.1 4.7 5.6 5.5 5.5 5.9 5.9 5.9 
NimarE 8.5 7.7 7.6 7.5 7.5 7.9 7.9 7.9 
NimarW 9.8 10.1 10.0 9.9 9.8 10.2 10.2 10.2 
Panna 5.6 5.7 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.4 6.4 6.4 
Raigarh 6.5 8.2 8.3 8.2 8.2 8.7 8.7 8.7 
Raipur 6.1 6.4 5.1 5.0 5.0 5.5 5.5 5.5 
Raisen 3.6 4.5 5.8 5.7 5.7 6.1 6.1 6.1 
Rajgarh 7.2 6.4 4.7 4.7 4.6 5.1 5.1 5.1 
Rajnangn 9.4 8.5 6.1 6.1 6.0 6.5 6.5 6.5 
Ratlam 8.3 7.1 6.7 6.6 6.6 7.0 7.0 7.0 
Rewa 4 3.5 3.7 3.6 3.6 4.1 4.1 4.1 
Sagar 3.9 4.1 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.7 4.7 4.7 
Sarguja 6.9 8.9 9.7 9.6 9.6 10.0 10.0 10.0 
Satna 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.5 4.5 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Sehore 4.7 5.8 5.4 5.3 5.2 5.7 5.7 5.7 
Seoni 8.2 8.2 7.3 7.2 7.2 7.6 7.6 7.6 
Shahdol 5.6 6.7 7.9 7.8 7.8 8.3 8.3 8.3 
Shajapur 6 5.4 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.6 4.6 4.6 
Shivpuri 5.6 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.1 6.5 6.5 6.5 
Sidhi 5.6 6.0 6.2 6.1 6.1 6.6 6.6 6.6 
Tikamgarh 5 6.6 5.8 5.7 5.7 6.1 6.1 6.1 
Ujjain 5 3.9 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.5 4.5 4.5 
Vidisha 3.9 3.3 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.6 4.6 4.6 
 
 
the distribution of land-holdings (simulation 3), unlike poverty reduction, had a single 
effect: acting through equations (1) and (2), it increased the workforce participation 
rate of children (Tables 6 and 7). However, in assessing this result, the possibility that 
inequality reduction might be an important instrument for reducing poverty should not 
be discounted. 
 
 
Table 8. Simulation results for child mortality rates: controlling for 
scheduled tribes 
 
District AC PR S0 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
Balaghat 167 131.8 153.0 132.0 124.4 124.4 124.4 118.9 
Bastar 129 126.6 127.7 119.5 115.2 115.2 115.2 104.4 
Betul 180 188.1 174.5 156.2 145.2 145.2 145.2 140.6 
Bhind 149 167.1 159.0 143.8 140.2 140.2 140.2 134.8 
Bhopal 105 128.8 115.5 86.4 80.3 80.3 80.3 69.9 
Bilaspur 123 119.2 123.2 108.5 102.9 102.9 102.9 90.9 
Chhatarpur 199 194.8 180.4 169.0 164.8 164.8 164.8 160.1 
Chhindwara 142 150.0 133.4 115.9 110.7 110.7 110.7 101.9 
Damoh 194 189.8 191.9 175.6 166.3 166.3 166.3 163.4 
Datia 178 177.5 178.8 166.1 163.1 163.1 163.1 160.4 
Dewas 129 158.6 168.3 154.5 150.1 150.1 150.1 145.3 
Dhar 122 142.3 135.9 124.7 121.1 121.1 121.1 115.4 
Durg 122 121.3 128.4 105.4 100.6 100.6 100.6 93.0 
Guna 195 175.2 171.3 161.6 158.6 158.6 158.6 152.7 
Gwalior 119 154.0 153.7 131.3 127.2 127.2 127.2 122.4 
Hshbad 179 166.9 153.4 133.2 126.5 126.5 126.5 119.8 
Indore 94 122.4 127.5 98.8 93.3 93.3 93.3 86.4 
Jabalpur 147 142.4 130.7 106.5 99.4 99.4 99.4 90.7 
Jhabua 169 177.2 150.3 144.1 138.8 138.8 138.8 133.7 
Mandla 132 134.1 159.4 147.4 138.4 138.4 138.4 132.5 
Mandsaur 150 134.2 154.1 138.9 134.9 134.9 134.9 127.7 
Morena 138 185.8 171.7 160.6 157.1 157.1 157.1 151.5 
Narsmpur 148 150.8 148.8 126.5 122.7 122.7 122.7 118.5 
NimarE 151 154.6 151.3 134.4 126.0 126.0 126.0 118.1 
NimarW 158 142.8 151.9 139.5 126.7 126.7 126.7 115.9 
Panna 204 182.1 188.0 177.6 173.6 173.6 173.6 170.9 
Raigarh 131 127.0 139.4 125.2 120.4 120.4 120.4 113.5 
Raipur 137 120.5 126.0 109.3 104.9 104.9 104.9 94.6 
Raisen 179 177.0 179.0 165.3 159.6 159.6 159.6 155.4 
Rajgarh 182 169.1 186.4 178.0 173.2 173.2 173.2 168.3 
Rajnangn 150 143.6 160.8 145.9 141.0 141.0 141.0 136.2 
Ratlam 149 131.2 132.7 117.1 113.9 113.9 113.9 105.0 
Rewa 196 179.9 171.0 156.6 151.6 151.6 151.6 148.4 
Sagar 172 177.1 161.7 141.4 132.7 132.7 132.7 125.7 
Sarguja 113 142.6 151.9 142.5 136.4 136.4 136.4 128.7 
Satna 203 163.8 161.6 146.6 141.8 141.8 141.8 136.5 
Sehore 178 178.8 181.4 169.6 163.9 163.9 163.9 159.0 
Seoni 152 150.5 154.2 137.5 131.3 131.3 131.3 126.1 
Shahdol 160 163.2 161.6 150.8 145.2 145.2 145.2 139.3 
Shajapur 168 160.9 176.0 165.4 161.8 161.8 161.8 156.8 
Shivpuri 200 190.3 181.4 173.0 170.3 170.3 170.3 166.2 
Sidhi 165 183.0 178.4 171.1 165.0 165.0 165.0 159.7 
Tikamgarh 187 180.4 178.2 167.4 163.9 163.9 163.9 160.0 
Ujjain 147 124.9 134.6 117.1 113.7 113.7 113.7 103.8 
Vidisha 191 201.0 184.7 169.8 164.0 164.0 164.0 160.3 
 
 
 
Improving access to safe drinking water (simulation 4) had the important effect of 
reducing infant mortality rates (Table 9), and improving infrastructure with respect to 
health centres—both in terms of access and in terms of bed capacity—reduced child 
and infant mortality rates (Tables 8 and 9). 
 
 
Table 9. Simulation results for infant mortality rates: Controlling for 
scheduled tribes 
 
District AC PR S0 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
Balaghat 141 142.6 134.5 134.7 127.9 127.9 113.2 110.9 
Bastar 98 93.2 92.6 92.7 88.9 88.9 77.4 72.2 
Betul 146 141.1 138.6 138.8 128.9 128.9 120.0 118.0 
Bhind 105 111.7 113.2 113.4 110.1 110.1 94.5 92.3 
Bhopal 94 97.9 98.8 99.1 93.6 93.6 93.4 88.5 
Bilaspur 109 108.3 106.0 106.1 101.1 101.1 90.4 84.8 
Chhatarpur 136 133.1 132.2 132.4 128.6 128.6 108.8 106.7 
Chhindwara 119 106.6 108.7 108.9 104.3 104.3 94.5 90.4 
Damoh 166 148.8 149.1 149.3 141.0 141.0 125.8 124.7 
Datia 131 119.3 124.1 124.3 121.6 121.6 111.9 111.0 
Dewas 97 117.6 118.4 118.6 114.6 114.6 107.3 105.3 
Dhar 99 101.3 103.9 104.0 100.8 100.8 95.7 93.7 
Durg 102 116.1 112.0 112.2 108.0 108.0 102.4 99.1 
Guna 124 107.4 113.6 113.7 111.0 111.0 100.4 97.6 
Gwalior 96 108.5 111.7 112.0 108.3 108.3 101.4 99.3 
Hshbad 138 117.0 122.4 122.6 116.6 116.6 107.6 104.6 
Indore 71 105.3 105.6 105.9 101.0 101.0 100.7 97.7 
Jabalpur 121 111.7 117.2 117.5 111.1 111.1 104.3 100.4 
Jhabua 92 103.3 104.3 104.3 99.7 99.7 92.0 90.1 
Mandla 114 131.3 129.5 129.6 121.5 121.5 106.3 103.9 
Mandsaur 111 123.7 117.4 117.6 114.0 114.0 102.2 98.9 
Morena 118 110.0 113.0 113.1 110.0 110.0 96.3 93.8 
Narsmpur 120 109.2 113.1 113.4 109.9 109.9 108.3 106.6 
NimarE 129 121.7 121.4 121.6 114.1 114.1 107.8 104.4 
NimarW 126 125.7 125.0 125.1 113.8 113.8 107.0 102.0 
Panna 132 131.2 132.6 132.8 129.2 129.2 110.9 109.8 
Raigarh 112 113.7 114.2 114.3 110.0 110.0 95.3 92.4 
Raipur 121 112.8 107.3 107.5 103.6 103.6 92.9 88.2 
Raisen 141 120.9 126.4 126.6 121.4 121.4 111.9 110.1 
Rajgarh 125 131.6 124.6 124.7 120.3 120.3 110.6 108.5 
Rajnangn 129 131.3 121.2 121.4 117.1 117.1 105.9 103.9 
Ratlam 128 97.7 96.1 96.2 93.4 93.4 91.3 87.2 
Rewa 149 136.3 137.1 137.3 132.8 132.8 114.4 113.4 
Sagar 138 134.9 136.0 136.2 128.4 128.4 114.6 111.4 
Sarguja 92 115.3 118.5 118.6 113.1 113.1 94.7 91.2 
Satna 142 128.9 129.4 129.5 125.2 125.2 107.7 105.5 
Sehore 125 127.9 126.1 126.2 121.1 121.1 111.0 108.9 
Seoni 126 128.0 124.0 124.2 118.7 118.7 105.9 103.7 
Shahdol 137 117.9 123.0 123.1 118.1 118.1 99.5 96.8 
Shajapur 116 123.4 118.4 118.6 115.4 115.4 107.1 105.0 
Shivpuri 120 116.6 116.9 117.0 114.6 114.6 104.3 102.5 
Sidhi 111 129.0 129.8 129.9 124.4 124.4 106.5 104.3 
Tikamgarh 142 135.8 132.6 132.7 129.5 129.5 110.3 108.9 
Ujjain 77 98.3 99.4 99.6 96.5 96.5 94.1 89.4 
Vidisha 107 129.2 133.3 133.4 128.3 128.3 115.3 113.7 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
The issue of “women’s agency”—of which the two most important aspects are women’s 
education and women’s paid employment—has, in the context of improving the 
position of women and the welfare of their children, received considerable attention in 
the development studies literature (Dre`ze & Sen, 1999; Dre`ze et  al., 1995; Murthi et 
 
al., 1995). Their results suggested that higher levels of female labour-force participation 
reduced the gender bias in child survival but did not have a statistically significant effect 
on the level of child (under five) mortality; on the other, hand, higher rates of female 
literacy unambiguously reduced child mortality. This paper supports the finding that 
higher rates of female participation do not affect the child mortality rate, but it does 
suggest that the rate of infant mortality is adversely affected. In other words, an 
important result from this study is that maternal care is significantly more important 
for the survival of infants than it is for the survival of older children and that the 
supply of such care is diminished, to the detriment of infants, through women’s paid 
employment. 
On the issue of literacy, the line of causation, pursued in this paper, was more 
complex: female literacy and participation rates were linked through female repro- 
ductive behaviour, with a further link existing between female participation rates and 
infant and child mortality rates.16 Higher rates of female literacy affected the repro- 
ductive behaviour of women in a way that enhanced their welfare: both fertility rates 
and the proportion of higher order births, in total births, fell in consequence of higher 
literacy. With several young children in the family, a mother’s available time, and the 
household’s resources allocated to children, would mostly be spent on infants, and 
older children could be neglected. Consequently, when the proportion of higher order 
births fell, women had more time and resources to devote to their older children, and 
the child (under five) mortality rate fell. In that sense, within the analytical framework 
of this study, rates of female literacy and child mortality were negatively correlated. 
This result is consistent with that of LeGrand & Phillips (1996) who found that, in 
Bangladesh, fertility reductions lessened the mortality of children between the ages of 
two and five but did not affect infant mortality. However, the position with respect to 
infant mortality was different. Higher rates of female literacy lowered fertility rates and, 
by improving women’s opportunities for paid employment, increased women’s partici- 
pation; but they also, independently of fertility rates, reduced women’s participation, 
for reasons discussed earlier. The empirical finding of this paper was that the net effect 
of higher female literacy rates would be to increase participation by a small amount and, 
thereby, through the maternal care argument set out earlier, to slightly raise infant 
mortality rates. 
This study’s conclusion was that the role of women’s agency in affecting infant 
mortality was dwarfed by the fact that the two biggest killers of infants in Madhya 
Pradesh were unsafe drinking water and poverty: the largest decreases in infant 
mortality could be achieved by allowing more households access to safe drinking water 
while simultaneously reducing the number of households in poverty. The result on the 
importance of safe drinking water supports the findings of Lee et al. (1997), who argued 
that conventional reduced-form econometric estimates, if anything, understated the 
importance of better sanitation and water quality on the health of children. 
On the issue of child labour—the existence of which has raised much concern 
recently in Western Europe and the USA—the findings suggest that the representation 
of the phenomenon (as, for example, by Basu & Van (1998)) as one driven by parental 
need allied to ignorance about the importance of “investing” in children, rather than by 
parental greed, is an accurate one. High levels of poverty and low rates of male adult 
literacy were associated with high rates of child participation. Overlying this, however, 
were two other factors. The first was the importance of family labour and the import- 
ance of child labour to the family’s labour input in making small family-owned holdings 
economically viable: ceteris paribus districts with relatively low degrees of inequality in 
the distribution of land had relatively high rates of child participation. The second 
 
factor was “cultural”: after controlling for other factors, districts with a high proportion 
of scheduled tribe persons in their population were those where child labour was most 
likely to be prevalent. 
The Madhya Pradesh government has undertaken a number of policy initiatives to 
address the problem of a lack of human development in the state. Under the Education 
Guarantee Scheme all areas which do not have a school within 1 km can have one on 
demand. The Mission to Control Diarrhoeal Disease, prompted by the fact that 28% 
of infant deaths in Madhya Pradesh were caused by diarrhoea, has taken as its aim a 
reduction in the incidence of water-borne disease through increased provision of, and 
access to, safe drinking water. A scheme of “barefoot doctors” (Jon Swastya Rakshak) 
has been in operation for 2 years to provide basic health care in villages. Against this 
background of pro-developmental policies, the contribution of this study has been to 
provide a quantitative assessment of their effects, particularly as they relate to the 
welfare of children in Madhya Pradesh. 
 
Notes 
1. Bimari being the Hindi word for a sick person. 
2. As measured by the Gini coefficient of operational holdings. The value of the Gini coefficient 
ranged from 0.47 in West Nimar to 0.72 in Balaghat. 
3. So termed because the Indian Constitution formally recognized the plight of the 
“untouchables” of Indian society by establishing their ethnic subgroups as scheduled castes 
(80 million) and scheduled tribes (38 million). Besides banning untouchability, the Consti- 
tution provides these groups with specific educational and vocation privileges and grants 
them special representation in the Indian Parliament. 
4. Grass leaves, reeds, thatch, wood, mud, unburnt bricks. 
5. Hospitals, community health centres, dispensaries, primary health centres and sub-health 
centres. 
6. Though  on  women’s  participation  note  that  Dre`ze  et.  al.  (1995) have  argued  that  paid 
employment could, by exposing women to outside influences, improve the quality of care 
they give their children. 
7. See Zellner (1962). 
8. In the absence of any cross-equation correlation between the errors there is, of course, no 
gain in efficiency. 
9. See Greene (1993), p. 420 for a discussion of the symptoms of multicollinearity. 
10. For example, any work involving domestic duties in a higher caste home is impossible. 
11. The female participation, regardless of its origins, has also (as equations (1) and (2) show) 
an independent effect on the childrens’ participation rate. 
12. The simulations based on the estimates of Table 2 were qualitatively not very different from 
those reported, and for reasons of expositional ease are not shown. 
13. These were the percentage gaps between the MP and the all-India literacy rates. 
14. So, for example, simulation 2 measures the effect of reducing poverty, given the higher 
literacy rates of simulation 1. 
15. In particular, TFR and BO4 were explanatory variables in, respectively, equations (3) and 
(4), and FPR was an explanatory variable in equations (1) and (2). 
16. Such links were not considered in the studies cited earlier. 
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